Cleveland State Law Review
Volume 55

Issue 3

Article

2007

Punishing Women: The Promise and Perils of Contextualized
Sentencing for Aboriginal Women in Canada
Toni Williams
Kent Law School, U.K.

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Recommended Citation
Toni Williams, Punishing Women: The Promise and Perils of Contextualized Sentencing for Aboriginal
Women in Canada, 55 Clev. St. L. Rev. 269 (2007)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol55/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For
more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.

THE 2006 FRIEDMAN & GILBERT
CRIMINAL JUSTICE FORUM
PUNISHING WOMEN: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF
CONTEXTUALIZED SENTENCING FOR
ABORIGINAL WOMEN IN CANADA
TONI WILLIAMS∗

I. SOCIAL CONTEXTUALIZATION IN THE SENTENCING
PROCESS ............................................................................... 272
II. 1996 SENTENCING REFORMS ............................................... 273
A. Rationales .................................................................... 273
B. The Reforms ................................................................. 275
C. The Impact of the Sentencing Reforms ........................ 278
III. CONCLUSION........................................................................ 286
The last twenty-five years marked an era of rapid and dramatic change in
criminal justice policy as states throughout the industrialized world embarked on
reforms intended radically to restructure aspects of criminalization and crime control
practice. During this era, decisions about punishment—what kind, how much, and
under what conditions—came under intense professional and popular scrutiny. The
attacks of the early 1970s on the “lawlessness” of indeterminate sentencing,
primarily because of the role played by judges’ personal views and the resulting
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extreme disparity of outcomes,1 and on the failures of rehabilitative sanctions to
achieve their goals, eroded confidence in the legitimacy of established practices.2
With the breakdown of old ways of thinking about and performing punishment,
space appeared to reform sentencing processes: to re-examine who makes critical
decisions about sanctions, how they are made and what factors influence them.
Seizing the opportunity for change, reformers have shifted decision-making
power from judges to legislators and prosecutors; they have restructured old
punishments and introduced new ones, intended to meet complex and often
inconsistent goals.3 Notable innovations include the transformation of complainants
into “victims” and the apparent empowerment of this new juridical subject with
standing and participation rights in sentencing and parole hearings; the re-emergence
of penal practices that link criminality more to character than to capacity,4 and the
development or, perhaps revival, of a risk-based model of law enforcement practice.
This forward-looking probabilistic model draws on actuarial methods to define risk
pools and profiling to populate them. Its focus is prediction of future behavior and
management of problematized populations rather than a particularized response to an
instance of individual wrongdoing.5
Superficially, at least, it appears that Canada’s main sentencing reforms of the
past ten years have little connection with the development of actuarialism and the
emergence of risk-based governance of criminal justice.6 Changes to the sentencing
regime ostensibly were intended to stem an increase in imprisonment that had
occurred during the 1980s and early 1990s. In this respect, Canadian policies differ
from those of similar states such as the United Kingdom, Australia and, of course,
the United States, where sentencing reform has contributed to an extraordinary
1
See generally JOHN HOGARTH, SENTENCING AS A HUMAN PROCESS (1971); Marvin E.
Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1972); Michael Mandel, Rethinking
Parole, 13 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 501 (1975).
2

See generally SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES (Michael Tonry &
Richard S. Frase eds., 2001) [hereinafter SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS]; Robert Martinson,
What works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22 (1974); Robert
Martinson, New findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentencing Reform, 7
HOFSTRA L. REV. 243 (1979).
3

See generally SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS, supra note 2; SENTENCING REFORM IN
OVERCROWDED TIMES: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Michael Tonry & Kathleen Hatlestad
eds., 1997) [hereinafter SENTENCING REFORM].
4
For historical analysis of changing conceptions of responsibility in criminal law, see
generally Nicola Lacey, Responsibility and Modernity in Criminal Law, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 249
(2001); Nicola Lacey, In Search of the Responsible Subject: History, Philosophy and Social
Sciences in Criminal Law Theory, 64 MOD. L. REV. 350 (2001).

Deleted:

5
See generally Malcolm M. Feeley, Entrepreneurs of Punishment: The Legacy of
Privatization, 4 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 321 (2002); Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon,
The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30
CRIMINOLOGY 449 (1992); Pat O’Malley, Globalizing Risk? Distinguishing Styles of “Neoliberal” Criminal Justice in Australia and the USA, 2 CRIM. JUST. 205 (2002).
6
See generally O’Malley, supra note 5 (providing thoughtful analysis of different modes
of risk-based governance and a critique of claims that full-bodied actuarialism has been
exported from the United States to other Western countries).
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“imprisonment binge.”7 A decline in Canada’s total incarceration rate suggests that
the reforms may have gone some way toward achieving the objectives of less
reliance on the prison, but further analysis shows significant and troubling variations
among different populations, with Aboriginal women being imprisoned
disproportionately and at higher rates than in the past.8 This finding is consistent with
evidence elsewhere that the imprisonment of women has risen rapidly and
substantially during the past two decades; however, jurisdictions reporting such
increases typically have deliberately chosen to expand the role of imprisonment
within their repertoire of penal sanctions. Growth in the incarceration of women in
those places may be lamentable but it is not unexpected. Since Canada has made the
opposite policy choice—and appears to have implemented it with some success—
questions arise about why women from its most marginalized population have fared
so poorly.
This article examines the failure of the reforms to remedy the over-incarceration
of Aboriginal woman through exploration of a sentencing methodology that judges
may employ to give effect to the reforms: the social contextualization of women’s
lawbreaking. Social context analysis developed as a critique of how the state controls
and punishes women and as a way to expose failures of justice.9 More recently,
commentators have suggested that the insertion of social context analysis into the
sentencing process might allow courts to find new and more robust justifications for
lowering the penalties they impose on women lawbreakers from marginalized

7
See SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS, supra note 2 (providing discussion of comparative
sentencing reform); see also MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (2d ed. 2006); JOHN IRWIN
& JAMES AUSTIN, IT’S ABOUT TIME: AMERICA’S IMPRISONMENT BINGE (2d ed. 1997). The per
capita incarceration rate in the United States is the highest of any country able to report such
data. See INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUD., ENTIRE WORLD—PRISON POPULATION RATES PER
100,000 OF THE NAT’L POPULATION, http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/rel/icps/worldbrief/
highest_to_lowest_rates.php (then select “Entire World;” then select “Prison population
rates”) (last visited Apr. 16, 2007). At least two million men and women are incarcerated in
prisons and jails and another five million are subject to the correctional supervision while on
probation or parole. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT.
CORRECTIONAL SURVEYS,, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/tables/corr2tab.htm (last
visited Aug. 22, 2007). People of African ancestry are vastly over-represented among
prisoners and those under correctional supervision, along with other minorities. See The
Sentencing Project: Research and Advocacy for Reform, http://www.sentencingproject.org
(then follow “Racial Disparity” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 16, 2007). For data on prison and
correctional supervision populations in the United States, see BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT.
CORRECTIONAL SURVEYS., supra (providing data from 1980 through 2005). For up-to-date
commentary and analysis of United States sentencing data, see generally The Sentencing
Project Home Page, http://www.sentencingproject.org (last visited Apr. 16, 2007). For
specific, up-to-date data see THE SENTENCING PROJECT, NEW INCARCERATION FIGURES:
THIRTY-THREE CONSECUTIVE YEARS OF GROWTH (2006), http://www.sentencingproject.org/
Admin%5CDocuments%5Cpublications%5Cinc_newfigures.pdf.
8

See infra Part II.C.

9

See generally Sonia N. Lawrence & Toni Williams, Swallowed Up: Drug Couriers at the
Borders of Canadian Sentencing, 56 U. TORONTO L.J. 285 (2006) (providing more in depth
discussion of social context analysis in relation to criminalization of women).
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communities.10 This article also considers whether the emergence of risk as a
rationale for penal intervention and control has made it more difficult for judges to
realize the promise of contextualized analysis as a foundation for less harsh
sentencing of Aboriginal women.
I. SOCIAL CONTEXTUALIZATION IN THE SENTENCING PROCESS
Contextualized sentencing is not a term of art, but rather a label for the particular
ways in which sentencing policy and practice may respond to feminist, anti-colonial
and anti-racist critiques of criminal justice processes and decision-making. With
respect to female lawbreakers, social context analysis engages with one of the more
enduring and consistent observations about criminal justice—that, although crime is
highly gendered as a male occupation, a very small number of women whose
circumstances seem very similar are consistently found in criminal courts and
prisons.11 Historically, the small number of women in the criminal justice system
tended to be overlooked, attracting little scholarly attention and having virtually no
impact on how officials thought about responding to crime and managing
punishment.12 Consequently, mainstream penal practices and institutions, although
presented as neutral and of universal application, were developed on the basis of
gendered theories of lawbreaking, theories that assume male agency.
Social context analysis seeks to explain the apparently atypical behavior of
women who break the law by situating women’s crimes in the social settings of
women’s lives, linking their offending to vulnerabilities attributable to the oppressive
10
See, e.g., BETH E. RICHIE, COMPELLED TO CRIME: THE GENDER ENTRAPMENT OF
BATTERED BLACK WOMEN (1996); Eda Katharine Tinto, Note, The Role of Gender and
Relationship in Reforming the Rockefeller Drug Laws, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 906 (2001).
11
Although some of the gaps between recorded instances of male and female participation
are smaller now than in the past, women still comprise only about one in five adults charged in
Canada, about one in ten admissions to provincial/territorial prisons, and one in twenty
admissions to federal prisons. See CAN. CTR. FOR JUST. STAT., CANADIAN CRIME STATISTICS
2002 (2003), available at http://dsp-psd.communication.gc.ca/Pilot/Statcan/85-205XIE/0000285-205-XIE.pdf; CAN. CTR. FOR JUST. STAT., ADULT CORRECTIONAL SERVICES IN
CANADA, 2001-2002 (2003), available at http://dsp-psd.communication.gc.ca/CollectionR/Statcan/85-211-XIE/0000285-211-XIE.pdf; PUB. SAFETY & EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
PORTFOLIO CORRECTIONS STAT. COMM., CORRECTIONS AND CONDITIONAL RELEASE
STATISTICAL OVERVIEW: 2003 (2003) (on file with author).
12
The outpouring of official and critical literature on women offenders in the last twenty
years shows how much that situation has changed. See MEDA CHESNEY-LIND, THE FEMALE
OFFENDER: GIRLS, WOMEN, AND CRIME, 1-8 (1997); Mary E. Gilfus, From Victims to
Survivors to Offenders: Women’s Routes of Entry and Immersion Into Street Crime, 4 WOMEN
& CRIM. JUST. 63 (1992); Judith Rumgay, Policies of Neglect: Female Offenders and the
Probation Service, in USER INVOLVEMENT AND PARTICIPATION IN SOCIAL CARE: RESEARCH
INFORMING PRACTICE 193, 193 (Hazel Kemshall & Rosemary Littlechild eds., 2000);
DEBORAH R. BASKIN & IRA B. SOMMERS, CASUALTIES OF COMMUNITY DISORDER: WOMEN’S
CAREERS IN VIOLENT CRIME (1998). For an overview of the literature, see also Darrell
Steffensmeier & Emilie Allan, Gender and Crime: Toward a Gendered Theory of Female
Offending, 22 ANN. REV. SOC. 459 (1996); KELLY HANNAH-MOFFAT, PUNISHMENT IN
DISGUISE: PENAL GOVERNANCE AND FEDERAL IMPRISONMENT OF WOMEN IN CANADA (2000);
TASK FORCE ON FEDERALLY SENTENCED WOMEN, CREATING CHOICES (1990), http://www.cscscc.gc.ca/text/prgrm/fsw/choices/toce_e.shtml.
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social relations, exclusionary social practices and victimization. Thus, advocates of
social context analysis argue that women’s lawbreaking tends to be differently
motivated than that of men: driven by need not greed, a product of fear and the
instinct to protect self or child rather than aggression. Because of these
characteristics of her offending, the female lawbreaker has been considered less
dangerous than the male; she is thought less likely to need penal sanctions to
communicate society’s disgust for her conduct and to create incentives toward good
behavior and more likely to respond to socially inclusionary and reintegrative
measures than to correctional interventions premised on exclusion from society. In
addition to these claims about the futility or unsuitability of imprisonment, the social
context theorists might point to women’s responsibilities for primary care of children
and elders, one effect of which is that the relational losses and social costs of
imprisoning women are substantial.
If the reactive, defensive, or protective nature of women’s crime serves as a
foundation for social context analysis, sentencing factors, such as those that mitigate
penalty, ostensibly offer the means to integrate a contextualized account of a
woman’s offense into the sentencing process.13 Judges are accustomed to adjusting
penalties by reference to the circumstances of the offense and the exigencies of
defendants’ lives. While judges have traditionally considered circumstances deemed
immediate and pressing or sought to reward defendants for their co-operation with
the criminal process, the social conditions of a defendant’s life, such as his standing
in the community or positive employment history, also may function to reduce
sanction severity.14 Such willingness to consider factors unrelated to culpability
suggests that the sentencing process should be able to accommodate and respond
progressively to claims about the significance of a woman’s social context to her
offending behavior. But not all contextual factors operate in the same way. In
particular, an individual’s experience of hardship or needs may be subordinated to
the perceived demands of social protection if that hardship or need is constituted as a
risk, as in effect situating the individual among the “dangerous classes.”15
II. 1996 SENTENCING REFORMS
A. Rationales
In September 1996, Canada enacted a new sentencing regime when amendments
to part XXIII of the Criminal Code came into effect.16 These amendments responded
13

See, e.g., Lawrence & Williams, supra note 9; ELIZABETH COMACK & GILLIAN BALFOUR,
THE POWER TO CRIMINALIZE: VIOLENCE, INEQUALITY AND THE LAW (2004).
14
See generally ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING
(Cambridge Univ. Press 4th ed. 2005).

AND

CRIMINAL JUSTICE 151-80

15
See generally JEFFREY REIMAN, THE RICH GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON:
IDEOLOGY, CLASS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (6th ed. 2001); Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Criminogenic
Needs and the Transformative Risk Subject: Hybridizations of Risk/Need in Penality, 7
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 29 (2005); Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Empowering Risk: The Nature of
Gender-Responsive Strategies, in CRIMINALIZING WOMEN: GENDER AND (IN)JUSTICE IN NEOLIBERAL TIMES 250 (Gillian Balfour & Elizabeth Comack eds., 2006) [hereinafter
Empowering Risk].
16

See Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46 (1985).
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to three main concerns about established practices: the broad scope of judicial
discretion at sentencing; general over-use of incarceration as a penal sanction; and
the disproportionate representation of Aboriginal people in Canadian prisons.
Sentencing law in Canada had historically shown considerable deference to
sentencing judges, offering them virtually no guidance and demanding little by way
of accountability. Parliament established maximum and (more rarely) minimum
sanctions for offenses, but judges played the primary role in deciding general policy
matters such as the goals of sentencing and the importance of various goals to
penalization of different offenses as well as the more specific questions about the
application of goals and selection of sanction in relation to a particular
offense/offender dyad.17 By the mid-1990s, a pincer movement of political demands
for more accountability in sentencing and experts committed to modernizing the
criminal justice system had discredited the lack of transparency and inconsistent
decision-making of Canadian sentencing practices. Criticism of these weaknesses by
an independent commission of inquiry, parliamentary committees, academics and
practitioners gave rise to reform proposals that were intended to provide a consistent
framework of sentencing policy and practice, enhance democratic accountability, and
improve public access to sentencing law.18
Reforms that targeted the general over-use of imprisonment were fueled by
administrative, fiscal and political concerns.19 During the early to mid-1990s, Canada
reported high incarceration rates relative to those of other Western democratic states.
For example, according to one often-repeated statistic a 1995 imprisonment rate of
132 per 100,000 of its adult population ranked Canada as the third most punitive
nation among a group of fifteen comparator states.20 More important than a data
point from a single year was the growth in the prison population during the early
1990s, a growth that seemed inconsistent with falling rates of police-recorded crime
and a declining number of criminally-charged adults.21 Absent any plausible claim of
a causal relationship between sanction severity and crime rate, this combination of
less crime and harsher punishments challenged the Canadian state in at least two
ways. Symbolically, the large and growing prison population conflicted with

17
See generally MAKING SENSE OF SENTENCING (Julian V. Roberts & David P. Cole eds.,
1999) (providing useful essays on sentencing in Canada); Anthony N. Doob, Sentencing
Reform in Canada, in SENTENCING REFORM, supra note 3, at 168.
18

This history is briefly outlined in David Daubney & Gordon Parry, An Overview of Bill
C-41 (The Sentencing Reform Act), in MAKING SENSE OF SENTENCING, supra note 17, at 31.
19

UB. SAFETY CAN., CORRECTIONS POPULATION GROWTH: FIRST R EPORT ON PROGRESS FOR
FEDERAL/PROVINCIAL/TERRITORIAL MINISTERS RESPONSIBLE FOR JUSTICE (1997), available at
http://ww2.ps-sp.gc.ca/publications/corrections/pdf/corr_pop_growth_1997_e.pdf.
20
CORR. STAT. COMM., CORRECTIONS AND CONDITIONAL RELEASE STATISTICAL OVERVIEW:
2005 (2005) (on file with author).
21
From 1991 to 1995, the police-recorded crime rate dropped by 13%, and the number of
adults charged fell by 15%. Over the same period, however, admissions to federal and
provincial prisons grew by 15% and the incarceration rate of charged persons increased by
36%.
CORR. STAT. COMM., CORRECTIONS AND CONDITIONAL RELEASE STATISTICAL
OVERVIEW: 2006 (2006), available at http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/res/cor/rep/_fl/FINAL
%20English%20CCRSO%202006.pdf [hereinafter RELEASE STATISTICAL OVERVIEW: 2006].
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Canada’s sense of itself and its place in the world as a beacon of progressive social
policy. More pragmatically, by the mid-1990s, correctional administrators and
political elites had begun to view imprisonment as an expensive and ineffective form
of crime control.22
Unlike countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, Canada did
not embark on large-scale expansion of its prisons for men, although it did increase
the number of spaces available for federally incarcerated women. Rapid expansion of
the number of prisoners therefore exerted considerable pressure on the prison estate,
creating unsafe and unpleasant living and working environments. In an era of
stringent fiscal restraint, reducing reliance on a costly, ineffective institution such as
imprisonment presented itself as a rational political choice.
Less pervasive but perhaps more entrenched than the general problem of overreliance on incarceration was Canada’s record of incarcerating Aboriginal people at
much higher rates than non-Aboriginal people, a record that by the mid-1990s was
well-documented and incontrovertible. One influential late 1980s study reported, for
example, that Aboriginal people, then about 2% of the national population,
constituted about 10% of the federal prison population.23 Focusing specifically on
the over-representation of Aboriginal women among prisoners, one study showed
that in the early 1990s, when Aboriginal people amounted to about 3% of the
Canadian population, Aboriginal women accounted for 11% of all female prisoners
in the federal system, and “nearly half” of the women admitted to provincial
prisons.24
B. The Reforms
Several aspects of the 1996 reforms respond to the problems of untrammeled
judicial discretion and over-use of incarceration: a statutory statement of the purpose
and principles of sentencing purports to guide judges;25 a statutory duty to give
reasons for sentence seeks to enhance transparency;26 and codified considerations for
decision-making include parity.27 As well as refining the decision-making
procedures, Parliament enacted changes relating to sanctions. It enabled diversion of

22

See PUB. SAFETY CAN., supra note 19.

23

See Michael Jackson, Locking up Natives in Canada, 23 U.BRIT.COLUM. L. REV. 215,
215 (1989). In the Prairie region of the country, which has a relatively large Aboriginal
population, the over-representation was much worse. Estimated to comprise about 6% of the
general population of Manitoba and Saskatchewan, Aboriginal people amounted to 46% of
admissions to provincial prisons in Manitoba and a staggering 66% of provincial prison
admissions in Saskatchewan. Id. at 216. For a more recent review and synthesis of empirical
and policy literatures on over-incarceration of Aboriginal peoples in Canada, see ROYAL
COMM’N ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, BRIDGING THE CULTURAL DIVIDE: A REPORT ON
ABORIGINAL PEOPLE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CANADA (1996) [hereinafter RCAP].
24
CAROL LAPRAIRIE, EXAMINING ABORIGINAL CORRECTIONS IN CANADA 33-34 (1996),
available at http://ww2.ps-sp.gc.ca/publications/abor_corrections/199614_e.pdf.
25

Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 718 (1985).

26

Id. § 726.2.

27

Id. § 718.2(b).
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adult defendants,28 modified the procedures governing the use of the fine to reduce
the risk of imprisonment for default,29 and created a new sanction—the conditional
sentence—which suspends execution of a prison term of less than two years.30 Other
measures intended generally to reduce the use of incarceration appear in the adoption
of objectives that ostensibly represent a restorative model of justice alongside more
established retributive, deterrent, and rehabilitative goals,31 and the inclusion of two
parsimony or restraint provisions among the factors judges must consider when
making decisions. One such provision, § 718.2(d), is uncontroversial: few object to
the proposition that judges consider not incarcerating defendants when “less
restrictive sanctions may be appropriate.” Section 718.2(e), by contrast, has proven
highly contentious. This provision states that “all available sanctions other than
imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all
offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.”
R. v. Gladue, the first Canadian Supreme Court decision on any aspect of the new
sentencing regime, presented an opportunity for the Court to interpret § 718.2(e) and
to guide judges as to its application.32 The decision concerned an appeal from a three
year prison term imposed on a young Aboriginal woman convicted of manslaughter
after killing an emotionally, and sometimes physically, abusive common law
spouse.33 The sentencing judge had taken into account a wide range of mitigating
factors, but held that there were no special circumstances to bring § 718.2(e) into
play because the defendant and victim lived in an urban setting not on-reserve and

28

Id. § 717.

29

Id. §§ 734-734.8, 736.

30

Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 742-742.7. This sanction closely resembles
probation, the primary form of which in Canada suspends the passing of sentence. Id. § 731.
During the ten years since enactment of the 1996 reforms, the courts have sought to
distinguish the two sanctions more sharply, both to facilitate administration of the new
sentencing regime and also to buttress the legitimacy of the prison term served in the
community. To this end, the courts have developed a norm of attaching punitive conditions to
the conditional sentence, while maintaining that the conditions attached to a probation order
should be primarily rehabilitative. A second difference between the two sanctions is the
presumption that breach of a conditional sentence results in the defendant spending the
remainder of the term in a prison; breach of probation order is a criminal offense in Canada,
but it does not automatically result in a prison sentence. As an attempted safeguard against the
possibility of a net-widening effect, in the sense of courts ordering the relatively severe
penalty of a suspended prison term when the less restrictive measure of probation is
appropriate, a judge may not impose a conditional sentence without first determining that the
appropriate sanction is a prison term of up to two years. After making that decision, the judge
then considers whether the defendant may serve her sentence in the community rather than in
an institution, taking into account at this point matters such as the risk that the defendant’s
freedom may pose to the community and consistency with the new statutory sentencing
objectives and principles. R. v. Proulx, [2000] 140 CCC (3d) 449 (SCC).
31

Id. § 718 (1985).

32

R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (Can.).

33

There is more discussion of the history of abuse in the Court of Appeal decision than in
the Supreme Court’s decision. See R. v. Gladue, [1997] 98 B.C.A.C. 120, ¶¶ 36-42 (Can.).
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therefore were not “‘within the Aboriginal community as such.’”34 On appeal, the
defendant challenged, inter alia, the underlying assumptions about authentic
Aboriginal experience that this view seemed to reflect.
The Court interpreted the reach of § 718.2(e) expansively, holding that it “applies
to all Aboriginal persons wherever they reside, whether on- or off-reserve, in a large
city or a rural area.”35 More generally, it articulated the twin purposes of the section
as establishing a general norm that imprisonment “should be the penal sanction of
last resort,” reducing over-incarceration of Aboriginal persons.36 When determining a
sentence, judges should interpret the section “as Parliament’s direction to members
of the judiciary to inquire into the causes of the problem [of over-incarceration of
Aboriginal people] and to endeavor to remedy it, to the extent that a remedy is
possible through the sentencing process.”37
According to the Court, the justification for judges playing this remedial role is
not that judges cause over-representation of Aboriginal people in prison by
performing sentencing in a discriminatory manner. While acknowledging that there
is some evidence of “an unfortunate institutional approach that is more inclined to
refuse bail and to impose more and longer prison terms for Aboriginal offenders,”38
the Court regards over-representation as primarily attributable to “dislocation” and
“economic [under-] development” of the Aboriginal society.39 Even if judicial
decisions are not the primary reason for over-representation, however, the power of
sentencing judges over sanctions positions them to play a limited part in “remedying
injustice against Aboriginal peoples in Canada.”40 To exercise this power effectively,
judges must adopt a “different methodology,” based on § 718.2(e), whenever they
sentence an Aboriginal defendant.41
For the purposes of this “different methodology,” judges must consider “[t]he
unique systemic or background factors which may have played a part in bringing the
particular Aboriginal offender before the courts . . . and . . . [what] types of
sentencing procedures . . . [are] appropriate . . . for the offender . . . [given] her
particular Aboriginal heritage or connection.”42 “Unique systemic or background
factors” refers to the history and contemporary social context of Aboriginal people’s
lives, and, more particularly, to how the effects of that context may have contributed
to the defendant’s offending. The Court classifies knowledge of the general
consequences for Aboriginal persons and communities of Canada’s colonial history
as within the realm of judicial notice,43 but requires specific evidence of the
34

Gladue, 1 S.C.R. 688, ¶18.

35

Id. ¶ 93, pt. 11.

36

Id. ¶ 36.

37

Id. ¶ 64.

38

Id. ¶ 65.

39

Gladue, 1 S.C.R. 688, ¶ 67.

40

Id. ¶65.

41

Id. ¶ 71-74.

42

Id. ¶ 66.

43

The Court does not use the term “colonialism.” Id. ¶ 69.
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relationships between such consequences and the defendant’s appearance before the
court, evidence of the defendant’s experiences of abuse and victimization,
discrimination, poverty, unemployment, substance abuse, family and community
fragmentation and so on. A judge who finds that such experiences have contributed
significantly to the defendant’s appearance before the court must then consider if
imprisonment is capable of communicating deterrence or denunciation to the
defendant and her Aboriginal community, or if a sentence oriented toward healing
and based on the new restorative justice objectives would be more meaningful and
appropriate.44
Thus, the Gladue decision essentially requires judges to consider the social
context of an Aboriginal defendant when passing sentence and assumes that such
consideration makes it less likely that an Aboriginal defendant will receive a prison
sentence. It also holds that where a judge concludes that a prison term is necessary,
social context might help justify a shorter sentence as fit.45 Other aspects of the
decision, by contrast, reveal ambivalence about the substantive equality project of
sentencing Aboriginal people differently to reduce their over-incarceration. The
Court expresses this ambivalence most clearly when it indicates that the sanctions
imposed on Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal defendants convicted of more serious
offenses should not differ much, if at all, in type or duration regardless of whether
incarceration effectively communicates a punitive objective to the defendant and her
Aboriginal community.46 This position apparently restricts the scope of § 718.2(e) to
less serious offenses—those where one might perhaps expect judges to justify noncarceral sanctions without resorting to a special methodology for decision-making.
C. The Impact of the Sentencing Reforms
Section 718.2(e) and the Gladue decision were hailed by some commentators as
“an important watershed in Canadian criminal law,”47 and criticized by others for
allegedly making faulty assumptions about the causes of Aboriginal overrepresentation and adopting a “reverse discrimination” methodology to favor
Aboriginal defendants.48 Another response expressed skepticism about the viability
of the new sentencing methodology, questioning the willingness or ability of judges
to apply it to Aboriginal defendants.49 Notwithstanding their very different

44

Gladue, 1 S.C.R. 688. ¶ 69.

45

Id. ¶ 79.

46

Id. ¶ 33, ¶¶ 78-79; see also R. v. Wells, [2000] 141 C.C.C. 3d 368, ¶ 42.

47
Mary-Ellen Turpel-Lafond, Sentencing Within a Restorative Justice Paradigm:
Procedural Implications of R. v. Gladue, 43 CRIM. L. Q. 34, 35 (1999); See also Jonathan
Rudin & Kent Roach, Broken Promises: A Response to Stenning and Roberts’ Empty
Promises, 65 SASK. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002).
48
Philip Stenning & Julian V. Roberts, Empty Promises: Parliament, The Supreme Court,
and the Sentencing of Aboriginal Offenders, 64 SASK. L. REV. 137, 161 (2001).
49
See Susan Haslip, Aboriginal Sentencing Reform in Canada—Prospects for Success:
Standing Tall With Both Feet Planted Firmly in the Air, 7 MURDOCK U. ELECTRONIC J. L. 1
(2000), http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v7n1/haslip71.html; Dawn Y. Anderson,
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conclusions on the legitimacy of § 718.2(e) as a remedy for the over-incarceration of
Aboriginal persons, detractors and supporters alike tend to assume that the new
sentencing regime has the intended effect of reducing the incarceration of Aboriginal
defendants relative to the past and relative to the incarceration of non-Aboriginal
persons.
Data on the use of imprisonment in the last ten years do not support this
assumption, as is illustrated by comparison of changes in the total imprisonment rate
with changes in the incarceration of Aboriginal women. Canada has significantly
reduced its reliance on incarceration since enactment of the sentencing reforms,
cutting the adult incarceration rate from 132 prisoners per 100,000 adults in 1995, to
107 per 100,000 in 2006, a drop of almost 20%.50 This finding indicates that changes
in sentencing policy and practice may have had the intended effect on the size of the
prison population, a noteworthy achievement when most comparator states have
increased their incarceration rates and prison populations.51
In contrast to this downward trend, however, the number of Aboriginal women—
and men—in prisons has increased. The data show, first, that the last ten years has
witnessed a much larger rise in the number of federally incarcerated Aboriginal
women than non-Aboriginal women in federal institutions. Specifically, the
Aboriginal female population of the federal prisons has doubled, (from 64 women in
1996 to 128 women in 2006) since 1996, whereas the non-Aboriginal female
population has increased by 14%, (from 244 women to 280 women).52 As a result of
this difference, Aboriginal women represented close to one in three (31%) federal
female prisoners in 2006, up from one in five (21%) in 1996.53
Relatively few women lawbreakers receive federal prison terms, however, since
these are reserved for the most serious offenses and offenders. In relation to changes
in the populations of provincial prisons, there are substantial differences between
After Gladue: Are Judges Sentencing Aboriginal Offenders Differently? (2004) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, York University) (on file with author).
50

RELEASE STATISTICAL OVERVIEW: 2006, supra note 21, at 5; ROY WALMSLEY, INT’L CTR.
PRISON STUD., WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 3 (2007), http://www.kcl.ac.uk/
/depsta/rel/icps/world-prison-pop-seventh.pdf.

FOR

51
Note that Anthony Doob and Cheryl Webster argue that long-term data essentially show
stability in Canadian incarceration rates for the past forty years. Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl
Marie Webster, Countering Punitiveness: Understanding Stability in Canada's Imprisonment
Rate, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 325, 326 (2006). Their analysis raises questions about the urgent
need for change expressed by correctional administrators during the early to mid-1990s. Id. at
327. They also point to a dramatic shift away from sentencing towards remand custody more
recently. Id. at 352-53. Thus, a drop in the use of imprisonment post-conviction may indicate
that more defendants are receiving non-custodial sanctions at sentencing because they have
already served their prison terms on remand. Id. at 353.
52
See ROBERTA LYNN SINCLAIR & ROGER BOE, CANADIAN FEDERAL WOMEN OFFENDER
PROFILES: TRENDS FROM 1981 TO 2002 (REVISED) (2002), at 46, http://www.cscscc.gc.ca/text/rsrch/reports/r131/r131_e.pdf (providing statistics from 1996); RELEASE
STATISTICAL OVERVIEW: 2006, supra note 21, at 58 (providing statistics from 2006).
53
See SINCLAIR & BOE, supra note 52, at 46; RELEASE STATISTICAL OVERVIEW: 2006,
supra note 21, at 58. Federal imprisonment of Aboriginal men has also increased since the
1996 reforms, although not to the same extent. RELEASE STATISTICAL OVERVIEW: 2006, supra
note 21, at 58.
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Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal admissions to both sentenced and remand custody.
Specifically, the number of Aboriginal women admitted to sentenced custody in
provincial/territorial prisons has not declined to the same extent as has the number of
non-Aboriginal women in provincial/territorial custody,54 and the remand admission
rates of Aboriginal women across the country have increased even more rapidly than
other remand admissions.55 Thus, ten years after enactment of sentencing reforms
designed to reduce incarceration, and eight years after Gladue characterized the
reforms as a remedy for over–incarceration of Aboriginal persons, Aboriginal
women are still over-represented in both federal and provincial prisons. Moreover,
the extent of that over-representation has worsened: there are now more Aboriginal
women in federal and provincial/territorial prisons (including remand prisons) than
before the reforms; Aboriginal women represent a much higher proportion of women
prisoners than before the changes; and they are significantly more over-represented
in Canadian prisons than are Aboriginal men.
The contradiction between a declining total incarceration rate and increasing
imprisonment of Aboriginal women raises questions about how judges apply
§ 718.2(e) and Gladue’s remedial sentencing methodology and why the results are so
unfavorable to Aboriginal women.56 Analysis of recent sentencing decisions
54

In 1994-95, the 2,447 sentenced Aboriginal women admitted to provincial and territorial
prisons accounted for about one in five (21%) of all female admissions, while the 2,123
Aboriginal women admitted in 2003-04 accounted more than one in four (29%) of all female
admissions sentenced to custody in provincial/territorial prisons. Jodi-Anne Brzozowski et al.,
Victimization and Offending Among the Aboriginal Population in Canada, 26 STAT. CAN. 1, 28
(2006). More specifically, the data show that the number of Aboriginal women admitted to
sentenced custody in Canada’s provinces and territories dropped during the first few years
after the 1996 reforms (from 2,447 in 1994-95 to 1,894 in 2000-01, a 23% decline), but began
to climb in 2001-02, shortly after the Gladue decision, reaching 2,123 in 2003-04, an increase
of 12%. Id. Aboriginal men constituted 21% of admissions to sentenced custody in the
provinces and territories. Karen Beattie, Adult Correctional Services in Canada, 2004/2005,
26 STAT. CAN. 1, 17 (2006).
55
Remand imprisonment has increased substantially in Canada since the mid 1990s. Once
again, Aboriginal women have fared badly, with almost twice as many admitted to remand
custody (2,751) in 2003-04 as in 1995-96 (1,403). Brzozowski, supra note 54, at 28.
Aboriginal women represented 23% of adult female admissions to remand custody, up from
14% in 1995-96. Id. Remand decision-making is not based on the same factors as sentencing,
and, in theory, detention before sentencing ought to reduce the likelihood or the length of
carceral sentences. Empirical studies have shown, however, that individuals incarcerated
before trial are more likely to receive prison sentences than those convicted of the same
offenses but released on bail. See, e.g., JOANNA KERR, CAN. FOUND. FOR DRUG POL’Y REPORT
OF THE COMMISSION ON SYSTEMIC RACISM IN THE ONTARIO CRIMINAL J USTICE SYSTEM 275
(1995). The quantitative data presented here do not show interactions between imprisonment
decisions taken at different stages, but the high levels of both remand and sentenced
incarceration of Aboriginal women indicates that other factors conducive to incarceration at
sentencing tend to outweigh the discount that courts apply for time served.
56
Note that Anderson’s study, based on cases decided up to 2003, found that judges often
did not apply § 728.2(e) either because they did not have the necessary information before
them or because they did not think that the defendant’s Aboriginal ancestry was sufficiently
authentic to invoke § 718.2(e). See Anderson, supra note 49. Sentencing appeals, such as in
R. v. Kakekagamick, indicate that compliance with the Gladue methodology is far from
universal. See R. v. Kakekagamick, C43843, [2006] O.J. No. 3346 (O.C.A. Feb. 24, 2006),

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol55/iss3/3

12

2007]

PUNISHING WOMEN: THE PROMISE AND PERILS

281

involving Aboriginal women illuminates some of the perils as well as the promise of
resorting to social context analysis in this setting. The following table summarizes
recent first instance cases in which an Aboriginal woman was sentenced for an
offence that caused death or injury. Of these fourteen decisions, five resulted in a
federal prison term of at least two years, one in a provincial prison term of eighteen
months, seven imposed conditional sentences and one case imposed probation terms
on two women defendants.

2005 & 2006 Sentencing Decisions About Aboriginal Women
Convicted of Offenses Causing Death or Personal Injury57
Case
Most serious offense
Sanction
R. v. Spence [2006] M.J. Impaired driving causing
2 years less 1 day
No. 238.
death
conditional sentence.
18 months conditional
R. v. S.O.S. [2006] M.J.
Infanticide
sentence
No. 146.
Criminal negligence
30 months (federal) prison
R. v. Schoenthal [2006]
causing death (23 month
term.
S.J. No. 242.
old son)
2 years less 1 day
R. v. Pawis [2006] O.J.
Aggravated assault (on
conditional sentence + 3
No. 4158.
nine-month old son)
years probation
2 years less 1 day
R. v. Kahypeasewat
Manslaughter
conditional sentence + 2
[2006] S.J. No. 587.
years probation
Time served (eight
Uttering threats + forcible
R. v. Heavenfire [2006]
months remand custody),
entry (home invasion with
1 day + 12 months
A.J. No. 1062.
3 co-defendants)
probation.
R. v. Lisa Gladue [2006]
18 months (provincial)
Aggravated assault
A.J. No 1196.
prison term
R. v. Diamond [2006]
Aggravated assault
18 months conditional
available at 2006 ON.C. LEXIS 3206 (finding that both counsel and the trial judge failed to
give appropriate consideration to legal requirements in Gladue).
57
For purposes of this research, I retrieved from one of the major electronic databases
(Quicklaw Lexis-Nexis, Canadian judgments database cases decided in 2005 and 2006 in
which an adult aboriginal woman appeared as the defendant. The search looked for cases in
2005 and 2006 in which the terms “718.2” and “Aboriginal” and “words beginning ‘senten’”
appeared, and 148 cases in 2006 and 146 cases in 2005 were retrieved. After eliminating cases
about men and one case about a female Aboriginal youth, the sample consisted of 36 cases, 23
in 2006 and 13 in 2005. I then reviewed these cases to select only those decided at first
instance where the defendant was Aboriginal, which yielded 11 cases in 2006 and 7 in 2005.
Finally, I eliminated 4 cases where the offense did not cause death or personal injury. Not all
sentencing decisions are published in the database; thus, the cases are presented as illustrative
of themes rather than representative of sentencing decisions about Aboriginal women. It
seems that databases typically publish all of the cases they receive from first instance courts
and from lawyers or court reporters, but judges, courts, lawyers, and court reporters do not
send every case decided to the database.
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Q.J. No.2711.

R. v. Byrd [2006] M.J.
No. 102.

Manslaughter

R. v. W.L.Q. [2005] S.J.
No. 13.

Manslaughter

R. v. Pépabano [2005]
QJ. No. 19000.

Impaired driving causing
death

R. v. Goodstoney58
[2005] A.J. No. 1454.

Second degree Murder

R. v. C.M.A. [2005] Y.J.
No. 98.

Manslaughter

R. v. Bone [2005] M.J.
No. 75.

Impaired driving causing
death

[Vol. 55:269

sentence (after deducting
6 months for remand
custody)
2 years less 1 day
conditional sentence + 2
years probation
36 months (federal) prison
term after deducting 12
months for remand
custody
42 months (federal) prison
term
Mandatory life
imprisonment, 15 year
parole ineligibility period
36 months (federal) prison
term, after deducting 24
months for remand
custody.
2 years less 1 day
conditional sentence.

As is apparent from the table, similar offenses may result in very different
sanctions. Each of the five federally sentenced women had killed someone, and so
had five women who received a conditional sentence. Of these ten cases: two
women convicted of manslaughter received federal sentences59 and two received
conditional sentences;60 one federally sentenced61 and one conditionally sentenced62
58
R. v. Goodstoney involved a mandatory life imprisonment term imposed on a defendant
convicted of second degree murder. It was the only decision to be made at sentencing that
concerned the minimum time the defendant had to serve before becoming eligible for parole
consideration. R. v. Goodstoney, No. 040193500-Q1, [2005] A.J. No. 1454, ¶ 23 (A.C.Q.B.
June 20, 2005), available at 2005 AB.C. LEXIS 1771.
59
See R. v. C.M.A., No. 04-01527A, [2005] Y.J. No. 98 (Y.T.S.C. Nov. 4, 2005),
available at 2005 BC.C. LEXIS 3671; R. v. W.L.Q., Nos. 1982 & 1983, [2005] S.J. No. 13
(S.C.Q.B. Jan. 7, 2005), available at 2005 SK.C. LEXIS 13.
60
See R. v. Byrd, CR 04-01-25268, [2006] M.J. No. 102 (M.C.Q.B. Feb. 27, 2006),
available at 2006 MB.C. LEXIS 102); R. v. Kahypeasewat, No. 43722164, [2006] S.J. No.
587 (S.P.C. Aug. 24, 2006), available at 2006 SK.C. LEXIS 576).
61
See R. v. Schoenthal, CRIM643/2004, [2006] S.J. No. 242 (S.C.Q.B. Apr. 13, 2006),
available at 2006 SK.C. LEXIS 241). The court does not regard Ms. Schoenthal as an
Aboriginal defendant, even though it notes that Ms. Schoenthal’s father is a Métis, one of the
groups classified as Aboriginal in Canada. Id. at ¶ 17. Moreover, the circumstances of the
offence are intertwined with Ms. Schoenthal’s relationship to members of an Aboriginal
community. Id.
62
See R. v. S.O.S., CR 03-01-24696, [2006] M.J. No. 146 (M.C.Q.B. Mar. 27, 2006),
available at 2006 MB.C. LEXIS 144.
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woman had killed her child; and one federally sentenced63 and two conditionally
sentenced64 women had been convicted of impaired driving causing death. One
woman convicted of aggravated assault received a fairly lengthy provincial prison
term;65 two others were conditionally sentenced.66 Finally, two women convicted for
their participation in a violent home invasion were credited with time already served
in remand custody and placed on probation.67
All of the defendants convicted of homicides and assaults knew the victims, as
did at least two of the three impaired drivers.68 Most of the victims of violence were
spouses or children, a finding consistent with numerous studies showing that
women’s violence tends to be inflicted on family members.69 In some decisions, the
relationship of the defendant to the victim, as spouse or parent, was specifically cited
as an aggravating factor as per the Criminal Code.70
Whether or not they imposed incarceration, most judges referred to the presence
(or absence) of “unique systemic or background factors” as shaping the defendant’s
identity and influencing the course of her life.71 The decisions catalog the
defendant’s experiences of adult and childhood victimization, substance dependency,
educational disadvantage, under or unemployment, dislocation, parental
abandonment and family dysfunction. Such background information typically is
taken from a supplement to the traditional pre-sentence report, satisfying the Gladue
requirement that the particular circumstances of the individual Aboriginal defendant
be specifically adduced and linked to the offense.
More challenging for the courts than procedural dimensions of Gladue is the
extent to which the “unique systematic or background factors” also represent aspects
of identity and circumstances that penal practitioners classify as sources of
criminogenic risks and needs.72 When presented as “Gladue factors,” considerations

63

See R. v. Pépabano, No. 200-10-001838-056, 70 W.C.B. (2d) 883 (Q.C.A. Apr. 11,
2006), available at 2006 W.C.B.J. LEXIS 1798. .
64

See R. v. Bone, CR04-01-25525, [2005] M.J. No. 75 (M.C.Q.B. Feb. 22, 2005),
available at 2005 MB.C. LEXIS 94; R. v. Spence, [2006] M.J. No. 238 (M.P.C. June 2, 2006),
available at 2006 MB.C. LEXIS 234.
65
See R. v. Lisa Gladue, No. 041043068P1, [2006] A.J. No 1196 (A.P.C. July 18, 2006),
available at 2006 AB.C. LEXIS 1267.
66
See R. v. Diamond, [2006] Q.J. No.2711; R. v. Pawis, No. 04-10006413-00, [2006] O.J.
No. 4158 (O.C.J. Oct. 16, 2006), available at 2006 ON.C. LEXIS 4071.
67
See R. v. Heavenfire, No. 060419140P10101, [2006] A.J. No. 1062 (A.P.C. Aug. 22,
2006), available at 2006 AB.C. LEXIS 1036.
68

See Pépabano, 70 W.C.B. (2d) at 883; Bone, [2005] M.J. No. 75.

69

See Brzozowski, supra note 54, at 6. See generally ELIZABETH COMACK, WOMEN
TROUBLE: CONNECTING WOMEN'S LAW VIOLATIONS TO THEIR HISTORIES OF ABUSE (1996).
70

IN

Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, §§.718.2(a)(ii), (ii)(1) (1985).

71

Sentencing appeals, however, suggest that compliance with the Gladue sentencing
methodology is still not universal. See, e.g., R. v. Kakekagamick, [2006] O.J. No. 3346.
72

See Empowering Risk, supra note 15, at 250-66; KELLY HANNAH-MOFFAT & MARGARET
SHAW, TAKING RISKS: INCORPORATING GENDER AND CULTURE INTO THE CLASSIFICATION AND
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such as unemployment, under-education, family dysfunction, and substance
dependency function as a reason not to incarcerate Aboriginal defendants, but when
regarded as criminogenic risk/needs they may serve as justifications for prison terms
to contain the threat the defendant poses and custodial correctional programming to
ameliorate it.
Cases in which judges imposed a non-carceral sanction illustrate different ways
of resolving the conflicting demands of decision-making based on risk/need and the
requirement to respond to the defendant’s experience of life located at the
intersections of multiple subordinating relations. One case construed the sanction as
a form of healing rather than a punitive intervention in the defendant’s life, with the
judge holding that a conditional sentence aimed at accomplishing restorative justice
would facilitate the defendant’s reintegration, reduce the risk that she poses, and
enhance community safety.73 This judge did not impose punitive restrictions on the
defendant’s liberty, and the decision limited the discretionary requirements of the
conditional sentence to programs that were believed to be conducive to rehabilitation
of the defendant in the community. This case may have viewed the defendant’s
social context as indicative of elevated criminogenic risk/need, but the judge
followed the Gladue approach of finding that a restorative sanction is more suitable
than a punitive one in part because it is more likely to reduce risk.
A more common strategy involved emphasizing the capacity of the non-carceral
sanction to punish, rather than its healing potential, and in these cases judges tend to
focus more specifically on how the risk the defendant reputedly posed would be
managed in the community. Judges employing this approach often constructed the
defendant as less dangerous than the risk factors seemed to suggest, deciding that
regardless of the nature of the offense and no matter what the defendant’s social
context appeared to indicate about her level of criminogenic risk/need, her behavior
generally did not mark her as a threat to society. Some of these judges found ways
to treat the offense as an aberration, often linking it to an unhealthy, dangerous
relationship;74 and they noted where defendants had avoided significant lawbreaking
until the offense for which she was sentenced75 or even for a substantial period of
time, such as during a lengthy interval between charge and trial.76 In other cases,
judges imposed a conditional sentence despite finding that the defendant’s social
context signified a non-trivial level of risk, justifying the decision on the basis of the
capacity of the community, through close watching and monitoring, to contain the
risk that the defendant posed.77
When responding to a construction of the defendant as a containable risk, judges
generally characterized the non-carceral sanction as meeting punitive objectives of
ASSESSMENT OF FEDERALLY SENTENCED WOMEN IN CANADA (2001), available at
http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/pubs/pubspr/0662654323/200103_0662654323_e.pdf.
73
See R. v. S.O.S., CR 03-01-24696, [2006] M.J. No. 146 (M.C.Q.B. Mar. 27, 2006),
available at 2006 MB.C. LEXIS 144).
74
See Kahypeasewat, [2006] S.J. No. 587; Byrd, [2006] M.J. No. 102; Heavenfire, [2006]
A.J. No. 1062.
75

See Pawis, [2006] O.J. No. 4158; Bone, [2005] M.J. No. 75.

76

See Spence, [2006] M.J. No. 238.

77

See Byrd, [2006] M.J. No. 102.
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deterrence and denunciation and then reinforced the punitive dimension through long
terms and the imposition of highly restrictive punitive conditions, such as substantial
periods of home confinement. Thus, five of the seven conditional sentences in the
sample are initially maximum terms of two-years-less-a-day, (with two somewhat
reduced because of time served on remand) and one is an eighteen-month term;78 all
except one include a home confinement term. Most judges who imposed a
conditional sentence added on a substantial period of probation, with the result that
the defendant was to remain under state supervision for several years, certainly
longer than if she had received a provincial prison term and likely for more time than
if she had been sentenced to federal custody. Conditional sentences such as these
potentially may result in more incarceration than the custodial sanctions they replace
because the longer the conditional term and the more stringent its conditions, the
greater the opportunity for the defendant to breach and the more likely it is that
breach will occur. Custody does not automatically follow from breach but it is the
presumed sanction and courts have held that defendants incarcerated for breach of a
conditional sentence should serve the entire remaining term in custody without the
benefit of parole or remission.
Unsurprisingly, criminogenic risks and punitive objectives tend to feature
prominently in cases where the defendant received a custodial term rather than a
conditional sentence. In some of these cases, the judges seemed to ignore or
minimize the defendant’s identity as an Aboriginal woman;79 in others, the very same
background factors that constituted the defendant’s identity as an Aboriginal woman
and explained her appearance before the court also rendered her risky and needy.80
More interesting than the conventional approach of incarcerating the defendant to
denounce and deter her and to keep society safe,81 are decisions in which judges give
significant weight to reintegration and restorative justice in their reasons for
responding to the defendant’s criminogenic/risk needs with a lengthy carceral term.82
These cases construct the prison at least to some extent as a therapeutic environment,
a place of safety, healing, and growth for a defendant whose life in the community
marks her as both victimizer and victimized. This theme features prominently in
W.L.Q., a spousal manslaughter case in which the reasons for sentence describe Ms.
W.L.Q’s “highly dysfunctional” childhood, which included a long history of
suffering extreme sexual abuse, and detail her adult experience of severe substance
dependency and a long history of “mutual assaults” and other abuse that
characterized her relationships with the man she killed.83 Noting that Ms. W.L.Q.’s
“family members are all in recovery themselves and would like to support W.L.Q. in
her effort to do the same,” the judge concludes that “W.L.Q.’s best opportunities to
obtain the help that she needs to have is through the programs offered in the Federal
Female Corrections Institution system including the Edmonton Institution for
78

See S.O.S., [2006] M.J. No. 146.

79

See Schoenthal, [2006] S.J. No. 242.

80

See Gladue, [2006] A.J. No 1196.

81

See, e.g., Schoenthal, [2006] S.J. No. 242; Pépabano, 70 W.C.B. (2d) 883.

82

See W.L.Q., [2005] S.J. No. 13; C.M.A., [2005] Y.J. No. 98;Gladue, [2006] A.J. No

1196.
83

W.L.Q., [2005] S.J. No. 13, ¶ 12-22.
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Women.”84 According to this judge, federal imprisonment is not a punitive
alternative to restorative justice but a means of achieving the restorative and reintegrative objectives of the defendant accepting responsibility, acknowledging
harm, and achieving rehabilitation.85
III. CONCLUSION
Clearly, more research and analysis are required before we have a fuller
understanding of why § 718.2(e) and the Gladue sentencing methodology have failed
Aboriginal women so abjectly. But this brief discussion has illuminated some critical
issues. While this study has found that judges generally attempt to apply the Gladue
methodology by situating the defendant and her offense in their social context, it also
has shown that this type of analysis may have problematic effects. First, there is a
danger of social context analysis portraying lawbreaking by Aboriginal women as
over-determined by ancestry, identity and circumstances, thereby feeding stereotypes
about criminality that render the stereotyped group more vulnerable to
criminalization. This focus on the Aboriginal woman’s personal history family, and
community shifts attention away from questions about societal discrimination and
exclusion and about the role of criminalization and penal practice in exacerbating the
problems of Aboriginal societies and individuals. The social and economic relations
and the legal regimes that maintain the subordination of Aboriginal peoples in
Canada are no more than the faintest of backdrops to the decisions.
Second, the association of the “unique systemic and background factors” of the
Gladue methodology with the criminogenic risk/needs of contemporary penal
practice complicates the task of employing social contextualization to reduce the
incarceration of Aboriginal women. When faced with an Aboriginal woman who
embodies what are perceived to be significant criminogenic risk/needs, the
sentencing judge is asked to justify a non-carceral sanction in terms of those same
aspects of the defendant’s context that point to incarceration as necessary to contain
and manage her risk of re-offending. While some judges may resolve the
contradictory thrusts of risk and restraint in favor of community-based sanctions,
social context analysis does not compel such a conclusion.
Although sentencing can play no more than a limited role in keeping Aboriginal
people out of prison, a project that requires substantial investment in the social and
economic development needs of Aboriginal individuals and societies, and may
indeed not be fully realized until Aboriginal societies have achieved a greater
measure of autonomy from the Canadian state,86 one can expect penal practices
including sentencing to make some contribution towards reduced incarceration, or at
least to not make matters worse. If social context analysis cannot fulfill its promise
of lowering incarceration rates, then we perhaps need to make space for new
approaches that focus more explicitly on the failures of imprisonment than on the
84

Id. ¶¶ 34-35.
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Id. ¶ 33. In C.M.A., another spousal manslaughter case featuring substance abuse, a
mutually abusive relationship, and alcohol abuse by the defendant and the deceased, the judge
also characterised the prison as a place of healing. Id. ¶ 20. However, in this case, the
restorative objectives seem to be subordinated to the punitive objectives that the judge also
cites. Id. ¶¶ 23-25.
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RCAP, supra note 23.
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failings of the individual. In 2003, Jonathan Rudin and Kent Roach concluded their
passionate defense of § 718.2(e) with the prediction that “[a]t some point in the
future, it tragically may be necessary to criticize § 718.2(e) and Gladue as ineffectual
in reducing Aboriginal over-representation in prison.”87 That point in the future is
now.

87

Rudin & Roach, supra note 47, at 34.
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